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home » Publications » Media » How Time Bought Space in the Search for Peace

Article published in the Belfast Telegraph, p 19, 15th October 2004.  

How Time Bought Space in the Search for Peace 

By Brian Lennon, s.j. 

It seems remarkable that the DUP and Sinn Fein are about to agree a deal which will see them both share power. Yet within Northern Ireland this reality now seems unsurprising to many. One reason why this deal is now possible is the sheer length of time during which the peace process survived. It is a factor often overlooked by commentators who have frequently focused on its impending death.

Each year that passed since the last IRA cessation in 1997 gave politicians and their supporters time to get used to new and often painful realities. The longer the process existed the more people accepted that these changes were not going to be reversed. This did not reduce disagreement but it reduced the emotional content of some disagreement.

For example, cross-border institutions were a major bone of contention for Unionists for many years. Yet when the North-South Ministerial Body opened in Armagh on 2nd December 1999 there was one solitary protester. The length of the negotiations had given Unionists time to get used to the fact that if there was to be an Agreement it would include North-South bodies. The lack of protest was in marked contrast to the situation in 1974-5 when the Sunningdale Agreement collapsed, arguably over this issue.

Similarly for many Republicans being part of a Northern Ireland Assembly and accepting ministries in a government devolved from Westminster were at first anathema. Yet over time they too got used to these and quickly gave the impression that they had been in Stormont (in nationalist eyes, that great bastion of unionist power) for years.

The fact that the Executive survived as long as it did was important. It gave Northern Ireland politicians a taste of power. The intervention of the British Government in suspending the Executive at different times was critical. Had they not done this the UUP would have resigned because of their dissatisfaction with the lack of IRA decommissioning. The appointment (or re-appointment) of a First Minister would have required an election within the Assembly. A majority of Unionists would have been necessary for this to succeed and this majority did not exist. By suspending the Executive the British Government was able to restore it without the requirement of an election for a First Minister, and so the process continued.

The DUP complained that this was not democratic. The Dublin Government and Sinn Féin complained that it was not respecting the will of the people of Ireland. But the rules of the Agreement - which the Dublin Government and Sinn Féin had accepted - allowed for this and if the British Government had not acted as it did the Executive would have collapsed and it would have been much more difficult to keep the process as a whole alive. 

The passage of time allowed for the relationship between the UUP and Sinn Féin to thaw at a leadership level, however slowly. This meant, for example, that when the choreography which was part of the UUP-Sinn Féin deal in October 2003 broke down, recriminations between them were much more limited than many expected.

The passage of time also helped many Unionists to accept gradually that the IRA cessation, while imperfect, was serious, and that the IRA did not intend to go back to full-scale violence.

David Trimble was able to go into government in the absence of decommissioning on four occasions and survive. Gerry Adams was able to persuade the IRA to decommission on three occasions and survive. These events could not have happened without the passage of a considerable amount of time. 

The  time factor also helped movement within the DUP. While remaining adamant that they would not go into government or work on committees with Sinn Féin, they did both. They also refused for many years to appear on public platforms with Sinn Féin but in time this also changed. When they emerged as the largest party last year they took part in the subsequent talks on the basis that they wanted a new Agreement. But they knew the two Governments would not accept devolution without Sinn Féin. If the DUP wanted devolution they would therefore have to come to some agreement with Republicans. Some characterised the behaviour of the DUP towards Sinn Féin as equivalent to that of the UUP seven years previously.

The length of the process also meant that over the years many ordinary people gradually lost interest in it. This was because of the interminable reports about issues such as decommissioning. It was not that these issues became unimportant to people. They just got tired of talking about them. The boredom factor set in. They got involved in other issues. The result was that politicians now have more space to do a deal.

The politicians have gone through a process over the past seven years. The restoration of devolution will help community relations on the ground. But it will take many years to get rid of the cancer of sectarianism because so many of the wider public have not been exposed to a similar process.

Note

This article is based on part of Peace Comes Dropping Slow: Dialogue and Conflict Management in the Northern Ireland conflict, by Brian Lennon, published by Community Dialogue (Belfast: 9032-9995; www.communitydialogue.org).