Home » Publications » Book » Peace Comes Dropping  Slow

Peace Comes Dropping Slow:
Dialogue and Conflict Management in Northern Ireland

by

Brian Lennon

Published by Community Dialogue 2004

Copyright © Community Dialogue and Brian Lennon, 2004

Dedication
To all who took part in Community Dialogue events between 1998 and 2004, to the staff and members who made these happen, and to our friends and colleagues in Stanford Center for Conflict and Negotiation who helped our thinking about dialogue.

Acknowledgements
Many people have contributed to this book, as it is a reflection on six years’ listening to dialogue between divided groups. Some participants attended many events, some only a few. Their sharing was often painful and difficult. Many may find their thoughts reflected in the text.

Others commented directly on the text: Chris O’Halloran, Gerry Ruddy, Gerry O’Hanlon, Cathy Molloy, Dominic Bryan, Bronagh Hinds, Mairead Nic Craith, Frank Sammon, Nigel McCullough and the Community Dialogue staff – David Holloway, Anne Carr, Kay Nellis, Genevieve Lennon, Theresa Cullen and Peadar McKenna. Norma McConville, Dolores Considine and Nan McKinnon gave much time to discussion of some of the ideas. As well, some of these, together with David Gaffney, took on the difficult task of proof reading. Samantha Askin helped with administration.

Byron Bland, Lee Ross, David Holloway, Steve Stedman, Brenna Powell and others from the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation have been incredibly supportive to Community Dialogue over many years. Through many hours of discussion they helped us develop our theory and practice of dialogue. They were also most generous hosts to us during several visits.

My sincere thanks to all of them.

Contents

     Preface 

1. Framing the Process

2. A Sulky Stalemate? Blocks in 2004

3. From Victimhood to Survival?

4. Beyond the Stalemate? 

5. Dialogue Theory and Practice

Preface

Everything about the peace process in Northern Ireland is contested: When did it start? Who made the most important contribution? Who were the greatest blockers? What role did violence play? Was there an agreement? Was the process a total fraud? How do we handle the past?

In 1998, a few months before the Belfast Agreement, a group of Unionists, Nationalists, Loyalists, Republicans and others, came together to form Community Dialogue. They disagreed about most subjects, except one: the importance of dialogue among groups divided by the conflict. Between 1998 and 2004 they brought together people from divided communities to hear one another’s feelings, values and experiences of the conflict about the 1998 Agreement. The organisation provided a forum where people, especially those from the Community Sector such as womens’, local development and community relations groups, could talk and listen to those whom they saw as their enemies. The instinct for this came from a belief that ordinary people were to a large extent excluded from the peace process, especially in its early stages. Perhaps this was inevitable. Nonetheless it was also a source of major problems because deals worked out behind closed doors had to be sold to the wider public.

By 2004 Community Dialogue had run over 500 general events, including half-day and evening seminars, nearly 200 local group meetings, almost 100 one or two-night residentials, 19 youth events and over 50 internal dialogues. In that period there were also over 30 newspaper articles, 24 publications and 24 radio programmes, some of a considerable length. All these were attempts to publicise the perceptions we were hearing and to encourage further dialogue around them. Many of these events were deeply painful for those who took part, but almost all also said they found them challenging and that they led to new understanding. This book is a reflection on what they said.

At the end of Community Dialogue events there was seldom much agreement. During this period we in Northern Ireland were divided about our past, present and future. Nor is the purpose of the book to win agreement. Rather, as with all Community Dialogue events, it is designed to encourage further dialogue, critical thinking and questioning: to ask people to probe themselves more deeply by asking:

• What is it that you really want?

•  Why do you want it?

• What can you live with, given that others want something different?

We hope that people will look at the points with which they disagree and ask why it is that others hold those views. What experiences have led them to that position?

In many of our dialogues people tended to address the current issues of the day. Yet these issues came out of a wider framework and the first part of the book attempts to describe this and to analyse the factors at work in it.

The second chapter, ‘A Sulky Stalemate’, takes a snapshot of the situation in 2004 shortly after the 2003 election which was dominated by the DUP and Sinn Féin. At this time the Assembly was suspended because of disagreement over ‘guns and government’, paramilitaries were still active, Sinn Féin had not joined the Policing Board, segregation had increased, the community remained both politically divided and physically segregated, and there was considerable tension at interface areas. At the same time violence was at a comparatively low level. This section reflects many of the perceptions which came up in our dialogues.

The third chapter, ‘From Victimhood to Survival?’, looks at the issue which probably was the most dominant in our dialogues: how to handle the past. No matter what topic we proposed participants returned again and again to the past. This was not surprising. Over 3500 were killed in Northern Ireland out of a total population of less than 1.5 million people during the conflict. The web of pain involved in these figures stretched from immediate family and friends through work colleagues to the wider public who felt fear and anger at the killings. Tens of thousands were physically injured. Almost 20,000 were imprisoned. The unavoidable trauma which was and is a legacy of all this was reflected in our dialogues.

The fourth chapter, ‘Beyond the Stalemate?’, looks at options for the future. Will we continue to operate in Northern Ireland in two highly segregated groups, with no basic agreement about the past, present or future? Will we move towards agreement, while still retaining our separate aspirations? Or will we come up with something different? What impact will the EU and the wider world have on us? What contribution will Northern Ireland make to the EU or to other conflict situations? Again these issues figured often in our dialogues.

The fifth and final chapter looks at Community Dialogue’s process and discusses some theoretical issues about this.

The violence in Northern Ireland lasted for more than 35 years. Like all conflicts it was brutal and often seemingly mindless. This book was written ten years after the first IRA cessation on 31 August 1994, followed shortly afterwards by the Loyalist ceasefire of 13 October. At the time these raised enormous hopes. The next 10 years were to show a mixed picture as violence declined considerably but divisions and bitterness remained strong. Yet at the end of the period there seemed a real prospect that the DUP, the strongest critics of the Agreement and Sinn Féin, the political wing of Republicans, might together form a devolved government. Yeats’s line, ‘Peace comes dropping slow’, seems entirely appropriate as a title for a reflection on this process.

Community Dialogue as an organisation takes no party-political position on any issue. This is because we think it better to raise questions than answer them. This is also a useful strategy, because coming as we do from many differing and opposing backgrounds it is unlikely that we would agree on much. The present volume is no exception. It is being published by Community Dialogue in the hope that it may be a stimulus to dialogue. The views in it remain those of the author.

1. Framing the Process

Governments, Paramilitaries and Others

Introduction

The Northern Ireland peace process was part of a long journey, with many ups and downs. In that respect it has been similar to processes elsewhere in the world where enemies began to find ways other than violence to handle their differences. It was a series of stops and starts, of three steps forward and one step, or sometimes four steps, back. It was a journey of pain, failed hopes, deep longing, insults, sacrifices; of people and groups reaching out to others, victims letting go of the past, others not doing so; of perpetrators admitting their wrong and asking for forgiveness, others justifying what they did, of governments lying and covering up, and also of governments devoting incredible energies to a problem in which there were few votes.

‘Peace process’ in other words does not refer to a comfortable train journey in a first class carriage through beautiful countryside in great weather, with friends you have cherished all your life. Rather it was sometimes like being stuck in a small boat in the middle of a vicious storm, with people who have hurt you deeply, whom you don’t trust a whit, and wishing you could be anywhere else in the world than on that boat with those people. At other times it was an experience of deep richness as one learnt of suffering and the response to it by people caught in incredibly difficult situations.

The central element in the peace process was the 1998 Agreement. The framework of the peace process was important because the Agreement was only one element in a much larger picture. Some elements of the Agreement may fail, but others will continue. Further, many changes which took place involved the interests of the London and Dublin Governments and will remain under their control, and these will continue whether or not people in Northern Ireland like them.

The following were critical elements in the peace process and without each of these it would not have happened:

• The role of the two Governments, and the influence of the European Community on them.

• Military stalemate.

• Leadership among most of the groups involved.

• Time to adjust to new and painful change.

• Ambivalent language.

• Democratic structures and international encouragement

• Economic change, particularly among UUP supporters.

This chapter now looks at each of these in turn.

The Role of the Two Governments

The recent background to the Northern Ireland peace process started in 1973. In that year both the British and Irish Governments joined the EEC. They did so for their own interests, hoping that the Common Market would give them an opportunity to develop their economies by increasing trade links with other countries and by opening up new markets.

There was also a visionary aspect to the EEC: in 1870, 1914 and 1939 France, Germany and other countries were caught up in terrible wars that left millions dead. The visionaries who set up the EEC in 1952 wanted to build political connections between the countries of Europe so that war could never happen again. The extraordinary thing is that they succeeded to the extent they did. None of the members of the EEC have gone to war with each other since and there exists cooperation, common policies and laws across a broad spectrum of European life.

In this context the Northern Ireland conflict embarrassed the two Governments, it was financially costly and the violence had a negative impact on the relationship between the two countries.

The conflict was not of vital interest to the US, but given the size of the Irish vote it was of some interest to political leaders. Ronald Reagan is said to have raised the issue frequently with Margaret Thatcher. In Bill Clinton’s case his involvement clearly went beyond the needs of his country and can only be explained on the basis of personal interest.

Apart from joining the European Community there were other changes which impacted on the British-Irish relationship. Military developments after World War II meant that Northern Ireland was no longer as important to the UK in terms of security. However, some British interests remained unchanged. They remained implacably opposed to any settlement which removed Northern Ireland from the UK against the wishes of its inhabitants. Such an outcome would have undermined the basis of the union between the countries in the UK, and the British Government was never going to consent to this. Because of this the IRA could never have succeeded in its objective of forcing the British Government to accept a United Ireland. Tragically its consistently made the mistake of comparing the British Government’s attitude to Northern Ireland to its historical attitude to the colonies: the colonies were not part of the UK, and the British let them go only when there was a majority in favour of this.

The Republic of Ireland, for its part, became more confident as a country through participating as an equal member with the other 11 EU States. It began to revise its view of Northern Ireland. Membership of the EU slowly reduced its economic dependence on the UK. However, the need to address the Northern issue and the gradual changes in Irish nationalism slowly led to a closer relationship with the UK as well. The US connection was also important to the Republic, not least because of the 40 million Americans of Irish descent.

Over the years between 1973 and 1985 and particularly in the final year of this phase, the two Governments agreed on a joint analysis of and approach to the problem and this emerged as the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985

The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement was the institutional expression of the new mutual interests of both States in reaching a compromise on the conflict. Under this the two Governments accepted that the conflict was one of a double minority: Nationalists were a minority within Northern Ireland and Unionists a minority in the context of the whole island. Each had different and conflicting aspirations. The right to pursue these aspirations was recognised, but only if done peacefully. The British gave the Irish Government a consultative role about decisions affecting Northern Ireland. Both accepted that if the two communities in Northern Ireland agreed, a devolved power-sharing government should be set up. If the majority of people in Northern Ireland chose a United Ireland that would be facilitated.

Both Governments gained from the Agreement through better relations with each other and approval on the world stage. The critical new element was a reduction in the nationalism with which both approached the issue. This eventually enabled them to stop seeing the problem as an internal issue on the one hand, or one of colonialism on the other, and instead to see it as a problem of a double minority.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement was critical to everything that followed. It meant that neither community within Northern Ireland could use the London or Dublin Government against the other because while the Governments might still disagree, they recognised that what they had in common was greater than their divisions. Before this each Government had tended to act as if one of the groups in Northern Ireland were its own clients. Now that gradually changed. Further, civil servants from both jurisdictions began to meet in the European Community several times a week. This further developed a process which had begun when the two States joined the Community. It helped each understand better the needs of the other and also how their institutions worked.

Positive results of the involvement of the two Governments

The time and resources devoted by both Governments to the peace process over a protracted period was both significant and at times unusual: for example, Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern showed great determination in sticking with the process when often it seemed completely hopeless, in marked contrast to the somewhat haphazard attention given by the Governments to the conflict in previous decades; significant because both were highly skilful negotiators.

The positive impact of the outside Governments on Northern Ireland was in marked contrast to many other conflict situations. For example, in the Middle East there is really only one powerful outside group, the US, and it is strongly biased in favour of the Israelis. The external Arab States, while nominally favouring the Palestinians and while also providing some military support, remained ambivalent and divided in their response. The Cyprus situation had some closer parallels: both Turkey and Greece are external to the island, but both are heavily involved in the conflict. The EU had an even greater role than in Northern Ireland because it has the power to accept or reject Turkey as an EU member (and Greece would have a voice in that decision).

The 1998 Agreement

The negotiations which eventually led to the 1998 Agreement took place in a context in which there were already limits to what any group could achieve. These li Under the 1985 Agreement the British remained in control of final decisions on controversial issues such as parades. Many of these were against what Unionists wanted. This introduced a new balance of power between Unionists and Nationalists. While Nationalists could not blame the Irish Government for decisions - since the Irish Government had no decision-making power within Northern Ireland - Unionists were faced with the fact that the Government they had seen as their guardians - the British - now sometimes made decisions apparently against their interests. There was nothing Unionists could do against this, as they learnt when over 100,000 protested against the 1985 Agreement but failed to overturn it. This encouraged a sense of betrayal among Unionists and fostered much of the bitterness which followed the Agreement. These limits meant, among other things, that:

• There would never be a settlement which forced the majority of the people of Northern Ireland into a United Ireland.

• There would never be devolved government in Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority of both Unionists and of Nationalists.

• Recognition would have to be given to both British and Irish identities within Northern Ireland.

• There would be a role for the Irish Government, but it would be a consultative one, not one of joint authority.

• What happened in Northern Ireland would be part of wider processes - the needs of the two Governments, their membership of the EU, US-British and US-Irish intergovernmental relationships - and the people of Northern Ireland would have only limited influence over what went on in those processes.

The Agreement had three strands:

• Strand 1: Internal to Northern Ireland, (issues dealing with the Assembly, the Executive, requirements that the consent of both Unionists and Nationalists would be needed to approve disputed motions).

• Strand 2: North-South structures, (bodies dealing with issues such as waterways, tourism, education and transport), with the Northern section accountable to the Assembly and the Southern to the Dáil)

• Strand 3: Irish-UK institutions.

It also contained a series of commitments by the British Government to appoint commissions to review policing (subsequently the Patten Commission), criminal justice and Human Rights, to give support for the Gaelic and Scots-Irish languages, and a three paragraph passing mention of victims.

Frequently during the peace process people spoke as if the Agreement had failed. This was because internal Northern Ireland structures had collapsed. Yet the wider changes brought about by the Agreement survived. So, for example, the London Government could choose to take the advice of the Dublin Government, or it could do a deal with Republicans about changes in policing, etc. Northern Ireland politicians and people could not block the two Governments when and if they chose to act together on matters within their power. So Strand Two (North-South) and Strand Three (London/Dublin, East-West) continued even when Strand One (Northern Ireland) was suspended.

This was the essential element the two Governments introduced into the conflict in the 1985 Agreement: they changed from opposing each other to working together on the conflict, and there was nothing opponents of this within Northern Ireland could do about it.

Each Government took risks in the peace process. The British Government were in secret talks with Sinn Féin long before the Irish Government knew. This was difficult for them, as can be seen by John Major’s comment - while the contacts were in progress - that it would sicken his stomach to talk to the IRA. The Government also persuaded Jim Molyneaux not to reject the whole process at the time of the Downing Street Declaration in 1993. They took the formal decision to suspend the Executive on each occasion before David Trimble resigned. Because they did this they were able to reverse the suspension later without the requirement of a new vote to approve a First Minister, a vote which would have failed because the Unionists would not have supported it.

The Irish Government gave leadership by agreeing to meet the IRA before its cessation of violence - and the IRA was at least as much a threat to the stability of the Republic as it was to Northern Ireland.

Military stalemate and paramilitary leadership

A second element which helped the process was the military stalemate. Both the IRA and the British security forces were able to hurt each other, the IRA by attacking the British mainland, the British by planting informers and killing or arresting IRA activists. But neither side could deliver a knock-out blow.

For the IRA to achieve a United Ireland they would have had to impose losses on the security forces heavy enough to persuade the British Government to expel from the UK one of the four countries which make up the Union, against the will of the majority of that country. That was always highly unlikely. To do so would have destabilised the constitutional basis of the UK as a whole and strengthened the hands of those in Scotland and Wales who wanted independence. No British Prime Minister was going to countenance this seriously.

From 1976 on the British Government started the policy of ‘Ulsterisation’. This put the RUC rather than the British army in the front line of the violence, and this led to less British army deaths. The Government also removed special category status from political prisoners, thus in their eyes making them ordinary criminals. This in turn led to the hunger strikes, the outcome of which gave Republicans a sense of what could be gained politically. At the same time British intelligence continued to impact on Republicans, which made it more difficult for the IRA to operate militarily.

From about 1990 the number of loyalist murders matched and eventually exceeded the number of republican murders. Many Loyalists believe that this led ordinary Catholics to put pressure on the IRA for a ceasefire and that this was a major element in persuading the IRA to end the violence. Most Nationalists doubt this. However, the loyalist killings succeeded in something else: they made it more difficult for the IRA to present their struggle as a noble struggle for Irish freedom. Instead it was increasingly seen as a nasty, dirty, tit-for-tat, sectarian blood bath which shamed the island as a whole in the eyes of the world.

There was never majority support within the nationalist community for IRA violence: Sinn Féin only gradually challenged for the leadership of the nationalist community when it became clear that the IRA were moving to end the violence. Republicans could have continued the violence, but it would have been on the basis of maintaining their ideals, not of achieving their goals.

All this increased pressure on Republicans to move towards a peace settlement. For their part the British army recognised they could not defeat the IRA. It was therefore in the interests of both sides to find a way out of a stalemate from which both were suffering.

Yet the violence continued for years after each side was aware of this. That is not unusual in conflicts. During the Cold War both the US and the Soviet Union knew that if they ever used nuclear arms the other side would respond with such force that they themselves would be destroyed. Yet for years each side kept developing these arms even though they knew they could never use them.

One reason for this is that any major change of direction by a movement is often seen as being unfaithful to the past and this forms one of the barriers to resolving political conflicts. Further, conflicts take on a life of their own, often no longer addressing the underlying original causes.

The military stalemate therefore left republican paramilitaries with a choice: did they want to continue with violence which would never achieve their stated aim and leave them isolated politically; or did they want to look for a new way forward?

For their part, the British Government were happy to seek alternatives - within certain limits - provided they were convinced the IRA wanted to change and that this would end the violence, especially on the British mainland.

Republicans and the cessation of violence

The military stalemate impacted more on Republicans than on Loyalists. Loyalists wanted to maintain the status quo. Republicans wanted to change it. The stalemate meant they were not advancing their goals through violence. So some among them began to look for other ways. This was not easy. It meant changing a central belief: that they could defeat British forces in Ireland through violence. Finding an alternative way to persuade them to leave Ireland meant a break with the past. It meant facing accusations of betrayal from other Republicans who continued to reject constitutionalism.

Throughout the 20th century Republicans had split every time there were moves towards constitutional politics. Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness and others had been central in opposing such moves in the mid-1970s. Yet it was these same people, now leaders in the republican movement, who began to make the first tentative moves towards politics in the 1980s. At the time it was highly unlikely that they could succeed in bringing the movement with them without a major split. Yet, for the most part this is what they achieved: there were dissident Republicans who rejected the ceasefire, but they were a small percentage. That was a major and unlikely achievement of the Adams leadership. Outsiders who only saw continued intelligence gathering, arms procurement, charges of spying, Republicans accused of working with FARC in Columbia and other incidents, missed the point that for many Republicans the major step was to engage in a peace process in which they would cease killing British security forces. The last soldier killed by the IRA was Stephen Restorick in South Armagh in 1997.

The move towards politics was helped also by the experience of IRA members in prison. Many studied for degrees in politics, sociology, law and other areas and were also involved in on-going debates and political analysis. This helped educate the rank and file about political aims and tactics. Republicans were therefore able to develop a series of political positions, not only on Northern Ireland constitutional politics, but on other conflict situations. Groups set up to lobby on behalf of the prisoners also developed organisational and other political skills and this was crucial in widening Sinn Féin’s political base.

The most important single event which helped politicise Republicans was the 1981 hunger strikes. The British Government’s attempt to criminalize the IRA was intended to present the conflict as one caused by terrorists attacking the legitimate government, and to downplay issues of nationalism. In fact this policy was doomed to failure because even at the point of arrest and trial, paramilitaries were charged under Special Powers, which meant they were not ordinary prisoners. But it also played on a deeply emotional chord among Republicans. They had always maintained a close link with their prisoners, and they were never going to allow them to be designated as ‘criminals’. While the wider nationalist community was ambivalent about this issue a large majority supported the hunger strikers when they began to die. This development was helped by nationalist dislike of Margaret Thatcher.

The death of Bobby Sands and the other hunger strikers had a strong impact on Republicans themselves. In the words of one participant at a Community Dialogue seminar: ‘I wanted to burn this place (the North) to the ground when he died’. There was a lot of street violence. Over sixty people died in the summer of 1981. Republicans began to see the potential of political action. This was not obvious in advance. They were divided among themselves as to whether or not they should put Bobby Sands up for election in 1981. Those opposing the move felt there was a high chance he would be defeated, which would mean a set back. However, when the elections went ahead and Republicans won, the rank and file saw the potential benefits of politics.

Electoral politics introduced one other element: Republicans’ success at the polls depended on movement towards peace. When they appeared to be going in that direction their votes went up, when they were not their votes went down. Their political support was also influenced by the judgement of Nationalists on British Government policy towards the IRA. When this was seen as harming doves within the Republican movement, or when Nationalists as a whole resented it, Sinn Féin’s vote increased.

In the 1985 Agreement the British Government said they were willing to move out of Northern Ireland if the majority of its people asked them to do so. This helped the process whereby Republicans began to accept that their problem lay not only with the British Government, but also with the British people within Northern Ireland, the Unionists. These were not going to go away.

From the secret contacts between the Government and the IRA, the British knew there was an element among Republicans who might be interested in a move towards peace. They did not know what they would demand in turn. Nor did they know if they could bring the rest of the IRA with them. For their part Republicans did not know what response the British would make should there be an end to violence: would they release the prisoners, recognise the mandate of Republicans, set up all-Ireland institutions, or start a process of withdrawal from Northern Ireland?

The decision of John Hume to engage with Republicans was crucial. This eventually led to direct contacts with the Dublin Government. This was an important change. Before this the Dublin Government, particularly under Garret FitzGerald, had been vehemently opposed to contact with Republicans, because, as he saw it, Republicans were at least as big a threat to the Republic as they were to anyone else.

Hume also helped develop contacts between Republicans and the US Government and this in turn led to the perception of a pan-nationalist front. This greatly strengthened the doves among Republicans: political gains began to look no longer like a vague possibility, but as something tangible which could greatly strengthen the movement as a whole.

The pan-nationalist front was a myth in so far as it was sold as something which would lead to a United Ireland. Neither the London nor the Dublin Government were interested in this outcome. Nor was the US. They wanted an end to violence and political instability so that Northern Ireland would no longer be a political problem. Nonetheless the pan-nationalist front helped deal with one of the greatest of republican fears: that they would be isolated politically if they gave up violence. (Ironically their violence was the greatest cause of their political isolation). Ending violence also offered Republicans the chance of ‘respectability’ and influence.

The pan-nationalist front was a nightmare for Unionists. In part this was because so many of them knew nothing about the mindset of the Dublin Government or the people of the Republic. Had this not been the case they would have known that the Dublin Government was certainly not interested in taking over Northern Ireland with all its problems and costs.

It is not clear what Republicans hoped would emerge from the Talks process. Their ultimate aim was of course a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland based on a single referendum held in the whole of Ireland. They were opposed to the idea of a Northern Ireland Assembly or Executive on the grounds that this would strengthen Northern Ireland as a political entity. They wanted the RUC to be replaced with a new police force and the withdrawal of the British army. They also wanted their prisoners released, human rights legislation and support for the Irish language.

In the event they won early release of prisoners, more resources for the Irish language, a review of the criminal justice system, commissions on Human Rights and policing (the Patten Report), they were accepted into the talks process prior to decommissioning, their electoral success won them two ministries in the Devolved Government, and North-South bodies were set up.

None of these concessions were particularly remarkable. Early release of prisoners, while painful to many, was a small price for the British Government to pay for an end to violence, and there was a precedent in the early release of the 1950s IRA border campaign prisoners. Nor did the Government have any great problem with giving more resources to the Irish language. The review of the criminal justice system, and the commissions on Human Rights and policing were more far reaching because - in the case of the Human Rights Commission - it would have implications for the UK as a whole. But changes in these areas would have been forced on the British Government in any case by EU legislation.

The setting up of North-South bodies also had a precedent in the 1974 Sunningdale settlement - although it was never implemented. With the improved relationship between the two Governments since the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 it was always likely that North-South cooperation would be institutionalised.

Finally, the success of Sinn Féin at the polls could have been available to them at any stage had Republicans not been involved in violence, and had they been more successful at an earlier stage in selling their political programme to the electorate.

Republicans also accepted the following compromises

• The principle of consent under which there would be no change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland unless a majority in both North and South voted in separate referenda for a United Ireland. In that case the two Governments would set in motion steps to bring about a United Ireland.

• The setting up of the Assembly and the Executive. (Republicans had to change their Constitution before they could take their places on these).

• The Patten Commission on policing (even though they later found it difficult to accept the recommendations, and had further difficulty when in their view the British Government failed to implement Patten).

The irony was that within two years of their 1997 cessation Republicans who had opposed the setting up of the Assembly were determined to be included in the devolved Government in Stormont.

Military stalemate on its own was not enough to lead to the peace process. It needed the response of Republicans for this to happen, and this in turn needed the leadership of the Adams’ wing. This meant taking risks, such as asking the movement to accept the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive, and the report of the Patten Commission on policing. In part Gerry Adams maintained his position by taking a step forward only when he was sure he had the support of the vast majority of the movement. That was one reason why he carried the coffin of Thomas Begley, an IRA member who killed himself along with nine bystanders when the bomb he was planting in a Shankill Road fish shop exploded prematurely, in October 1993: non-Republicans asked how he could possibly do this if he was interested in peace. The answer was that had he not done so he would have been seen as betraying his own side. Further, he was a Republican and as such he would have wanted to carry the coffin of someone he saw as a comrade-in-arms. This simply illustrates the fact that the peace process was about setting up institutions in which bitterly opposed enemies could find a way eventually to work together.

Republicans were helped change by the prospect of being included in politics in Northern Ireland as equals with everyone else. In their view equality had to come first. With this in place the need for arms would disappear and then there would be an end to violence. The unionist view was exactly the opposite: in order to be accepted into democratic politics Republicans would have to prove their credentials by showing they had given up violence first.

At the time of the 1994 cessation Republicans retained their paramilitary capacity, as they were to show less than two years laterin the attack at Canary Wharf in London. So it was they themselves who decided to end their violence. The decision was not imposed on them from the outside. At the same time the the history of the Troubles had shown that they could not achieve their stated objective of a United Ireland through violence.

The Loyalist ceasefire

In the mid-1960s Loyalism was controlled by right-wing Protestants. Many claimed they went into paramilitarism because of the influence of people like Ian Paisley. However, during their time in jail some of these abandoned sectarianism and developed political thinking. They were later to play a key role in persuading other Loyalists to abandon violence.

Many Loyalists argued that they wanted to maintain the Union and protect their communities. In their view they existed only because of the IRA. They saw themselves as doing the job that the security forces could not do because they were held back by laws. While the republican movement claimed that their war was against the State, Loyalists saw much of the IRA campaign directed at their own communities. In the loyalist view, then, the IRA waged a sectarian war and their own violence was a response to this.

Many of their targets were innocent Catholics. Some Loyalists viewed this as appropriate because they saw all Catholics as either Republicans or republican supporters and therefore traitors to the State: each Catholic killed was one less threat to the Union. Others thought it was strategic to attack innocent Catholics because it gave the message to the wider nationalist community that they would pay a price for IRA actions. They hoped this would lead to pressure on the IRA from within the Catholic community.

Given their claim that their violence was reactive some argued it was logical that a loyalist ceasefire would come soon after the IRA cessation of 31 August 1994. However, others argued against the ceasefire on the grounds that the IRA were being merely tactical. As with Republicans, so also among Loyalists, leadership was an important ingredient in persuading the different groups to end violence. The loyalist apology which expressed ‘abject and true remorse’ was an important contribution at the time.

Over the years Loyalists had produced various suggestions for a political way forward, including Common Sense, written by John McMichael in 1987, and also proposals for independence, although these were always going to be dismissed by Nationalists because in their view they gave insufficient protection to minorities. With the IRA cessation, however, Loyalists faced a problem. They had been defending Northern Ireland against the IRA. If the IRA really stopped violence what role could Loyalists have in the future?

Most Nationalists who had been opposed to violence were prepared to forget past Republican violence and support Sinn Féin inclusion in government. Increasing numbers were even prepared to vote for them, considering them effective in championing wider nationalist concerns. Within the unionist community, however, Loyalists had ambivalent support at best. Many would quietly acknowledge that they were needed during the conflict but few were prepared to support them politically when it came to voting and many would have liked them to simply disappear. This may in part have been due to Loyalism’s failure to put more effort into its political development. But it was also due in large part to Unionism’s ambiguous relationship with Loyalists, viewing them as a necessary evil on the one hand, immoral and illegitimate on the other.

To a degree Loyalists were also the victims of class politics within the unionist community. One of the results of focussing on the unionist-nationalist conflict was that the interests of working-class Protestants were neglected. Further, it was they, not better-off Protestants, who bore the brunt of the conflict, both in killing Nationalists and in suffering casualties themselves. It was only after 1994 that - at least in the public eye - Loyalists began to show an awareness of the way they had been used by others in the Protestant community. The fear of nationalist gains always made it difficult to focus on class issues.

Loyalists were nowhere near as united as Republicans. At the ceasefire they were already split between the UVF and UDA and they fragmented further not only with the LVF splitting from the UVF, but also with internal factions developing within many of the groups.

Finally, the majority of Loyalists suffered from a lower educational achievement than Republicans, many of whom used their time in jail to gain qualifications and degrees. This was largely because at the start of the Troubles more Protestants than Catholics were employed in industries such as ship building in which book learning was not required for many of the jobs. Catholics had never had the same entry to State subsidised jobs and so realised that education was vital to their interests. Economic changes during the Troubles led to a downsizing of the manufacturing sector and a growth of a more knowledge based economy. Because of their improved education working-class Catholics benefited more from this than working-class Protestants. Loyalists were therefore seen to benefit less than Republicans from the peace process and this increased the bitterness of many.

Ambivalent role of paramilitaries

The role of paramilitary leaders has been ambiguous. On the one hand they participated in and led groups which carried out some of the most terrible deeds in the history of this island. On the other hand many played a crucial role in keeping their followers involved in ceasefires, however imperfect, and in renegotiating new ceasefires when existing ones broke down. They did this in a context where they were often scapegoated as being the only cause of violence. It is therefore true that without the contribution of the paramilitaries violence would have been greatly reduced, but also that the reduction of violence which took place during the peace process would not have happened.

The IRA cessation and the loyalist ceasefire of 1994 were critical moments in the peace process. They meant at least that violence would be reduced. They did not mean, as we know to our regret, that it would be over. At the time of the ceasefires many questions remained unanswered:

• Could the cessation and the ceasefire be maintained?

• What role could former paramilitaries play in constitutional politics?

• What would be done about prisoners convicted of crimes arising from the Troubles?

• How could the understanding between the two Governments be developed?

• Could the constitutional parties, the parties linked to paramilitaries, and the two Governments agree not only on the underlying constitutional questions, but also about issues such as power-sharing, the day-to-day running of government, and North-South or East-West bodies?

• What would happen to victims?

• How would we handle the past?

The ceasefires opened the possibility that those formerly engaged in violence could enter the constitutional mainstream. This meant a change from the UUP-SDLP negotiations which had been going on in a stop-start way since 1974: now both Unionists and the SDLP would have to face the real possibility of Sinn Fein being part of any future power sharing arrangement.

The role of constitutional parties and others

The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), like other parties, was a broad church with many different groupings. Its central aim was to defend the Union. It had a strong integrationist wing who wanted to copper-fasten the Union and avoid devolution. Jim Molyneaux, former leader of the UUP, accurately foresaw that the IRA cessation would undermine integration. He said it ‘started destabilising the whole population in Northern Ireland. It was not an occasion for celebration, quite the opposite’ (Independent, 10 July 1999).

For many Unionists their greatest nightmare was to see Republicans in government. At the start of the process it was inconceivable to them that a group who had murdered members of the security forces for over 30 years, who remained unrepentant and who were dedicated to overthrowing the State, could end up in government.

Others, some of whom were opposed to Republicans in government and some who were not, resisted the involvement of the Irish Government in Northern Ireland. This was against the background of UUP opposition to the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. There was a difference, however, in the years immediately before the 1998 Agreement: many Unionists realised their opposition to the 1985 Agreement had been ineffective and that the two Governments could choose to ignore them again. The alternative was to negotiate. Further, these negotiations would have to include the Irish Government.

At the time of the ceasefires Unionists faced a further dilemma. If there was to be an agreement this would involve negotiating with Republicans, albeit indirectly through the two Governments and other intermediaries, with the possibility that this would lead to Republicans being in government, despite the fact that this was what many wanted to avoid. This inevitably led to blocking and delaying tactics. At the same time, if Republicans were serious about moving towards peace, was it better, from a unionist point of view, to have them inside or outside the process? For many years in the process, Unionists now argue, Republicans did not engage effectively in the Talks. Either they were outside the process because of IRA violence, or else, rather than negotiate they merely repeated republican rhetoric. However, towards the beginning of 1998, key Unionists began to believe that Republicans wanted to engage seriously, because they did not withdraw from the Talks even though their opposition to a Northern Ireland Assembly was proving unsuccessful.

Other Unionists remained opposed to entering government with Sinn Féin. Reasons for this included feelings about what Republicans had done in the past, religious views which opposed political partnership with unrepentant terrorists, and the contradiction of Sinn Féin being linked to a private army while taking part in democratic politics.

During the process Unionists frequently felt marginalised as the British Government focussed on Sinn Féin. In fact once the IRA declared a cessation this was probably inevitable because the primary aim of the British Government was to prevent them returning to violence.

It should have been obvious that any agreement was going to include Sinn Féin, because a central motive for the British Government’s involvement was to ensure an end to republican violence and the obvious way to do this was to draw them into government. Yet several Unionists pointed out to us the shock that many negotiators experienced in the week before the 1998 Agreement when George Mitchell produced the first draft of the Agreement precisely because it would give Sinn Féin a seat in government. Up to this negotiations had been about the separate parts of the Agreement. This was the first time that people saw the full picture.

The UUP focussed on decommissioning as a sign that the violence was over. For many it became the Holy Grail. Some later saw this as a mistake and came to accept that Republicans used decommissioning to extract on-going concessions. The wider community found these continuous concessions ‘debilitating’, in the words of one Unionist.

Arguably many Unionists who voted for the Agreement - estimated at barely over 50% - did so in the expectation that they were getting ‘peace’. ‘Peace’ meant different things to different people but it included the idea that violence was at an end and it did not include continuing enquiries directed against unionist interests, such as actions of the security forces and the renaming of the RUC.

David Trimble is often condemned by Nationalists for not giving leadership. In fact he was always ahead of his own community. Had he not led them into government on four occasions with Sinn Féin, while the IRA was still active, the devolved government would not have been set up. Equally, if he had not collapsed the Executive on four occasions he would not have survived as leader. These decisions were crucial and they enabled the process to survive.

For its part the DUP, led by Ian Paisley, also wanted devolution, but without Sinn Féin. Indeed some only became open to the idea of power-sharing with the SDLP after the 1990-91 talks. Throughout the negotiations they were able to present a harder face than the UUP by highlighting the painful decisions made by Unionists who supported the Agreement: tolerating early release of prisoners (this was a British Government decision), going into government with Sinn Féin, etc. Electorally this helped them as unionist voters progressively distanced themselves from the Agreement. It is estimated that over 100,000 Unionists voted in the Agreement referendum who have not voted since and most of these were probably Yes voters. As a result the proportion of unionist Yes voters dwindled considerably in the years after the referendum. Many Unionists would have found it difficult in any case to share power with Sinn Féin, but a considerable proportion were willing to do so in the context of what they saw as an end to violence. Decommissioning became the litmus test for this, and by the time the IRA eventually destroyed some weapons it was too little too late for many.

Like the UUP, the DUP were determined to maintain as large a security-force presence as possible, to ensure there were no changes in the RUC whom they saw as having been the front line against terrorism, to block early release of prisoners and the emergence of North-South bodies. On all these issues they failed. So Unionists, like Republicans, had to face many painful compromises during the process.

The DUP’s role was seen by many as entirely negative. Yet they gave a voice to those who for a variety of reasons opposed the process. Without this more might have to turned to violence. They also stood for the principle that no party should be in government while still linked to arms. While individuals in the party can certainly be challenged about their previous links with paramilitaries, the pressure from the DUP was an important element in bringing the IRA to the point where public consideration was given by Gerry Adams in 2004 to their ceasing all activity. At the end of that summer it seemed as if the DUP were about to take a more positive role by entering into serious negotiations with Sinn Féin, albeit doing so through the British Government.

Policy in the SDLP was dominated by John Hume. His decision to engage in negotiations with Sinn Féin was a crucial factor in helping Republicans edge towards a cessation of violence. In this process he brought with him the influence he had developed over twenty years in Belfast, Dublin, London and Washington.

Many Unionists believe they could have had a power-sharing deal with the SDLP, without Sinn Féin, in the 1991-92 talks had it not been that Hume was engaged in secret talks with Adams and so did not want an agreement which excluded Sinn Féin. Secondly, many in his own party had no idea what he was involved in. This was made all the more difficult for them by threats and hoax bomb attacks against them by Loyalists. At one stage there was pressure on Hume from members of his own party to end the contact with Adams. Thirdly, by bringing Sinn Féin into the political process Hume inevitably made electoral life more difficult for his own party.

The SDLP argued that they were the major architects of the 1998 Agreement and that the final document was simply the three-stranded process of Northern Ireland, North-South and East-West structures that John Hume had been calling for since early in the process. The Agreement was, in the words of Seamus Mallon, ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’. The SDLP argued that Sinn Féin stayed outside the process for most of it, then came in after most of the concessions were won, got some extra concessions, and were then rewarded by the electorate with no recognition given to SDLP achievements.

The SDLP wanted an Assembly having an Executive with legislative and executive functions. They were against devolved policing and justice as they did not think they would be workable. They were enthusiastic about North-South structures and saw these partly as instruments for practical cooperation and partly necessary to emphasise Irish identity within Northern Ireland. Some were surprised at getting so many of their demands in Strand I - internal Northern Ireland matters - but this was because Unionists were focussed on Strand II issues where they wanted to limit republican demands on North-South bodies.

Other groups at different times made crucial decisions which were vital at the time to keeping the peace process alive. Some examples are:

• The British Government’s secret talks with the IRA very early in the process, and their decisions to suspend the Executive on four occasions, each time in their view as a means of keeping the process alive.

• The Dublin Government’s decision to hold a referendum which gave up the alleged claim over Northern Ireland, and also their decision to encourage the US Government to take a positive view of change within the IRA, and Bill Clinton’s decision to grant a visa to Gerry Adams in 1994 in the face of vehement British Government opposition.

Each of these decisions was a judgment call by the leaders concerned. If they had got them wrong the process might well have collapsed. Each was difficult because there was often strong opposition from their own side. (In the case of Unionists these divisions were seen in public; among Republicans they were kept behind closed doors). However, because the two communities remained so segregated each misinterpreted what was going on in the other. The result was that few were able to see the cost involved in the changes made by the other side, or that these changes were really meant as a move towards a settlement. Instead, suspicions grew that each side was simply trying to crush the other.

Had the two communities been engaged in dialogue this misinterpretation would have been less likely. The failure to take part in dialogue was a critical factor in the problems which arose.

Behind-the-scenes mediation was critical in the early stages of the process. At that point the only way any of the parties had of knowing what others were open to was through intermediaries. Some of these, like Denis Bradley - later Vice-Chair of the Policing Board - made links between the IRA and the British government. Many see this link, which predated the Hume-Adams talks, as the most important of the conduits. Others, like Fr Alex Reid and Martin Mansergh, made links between the IRA and the Dublin government. Civil servants played a key and often hidden role. Protestant clergy played a particular role in meeting Sinn Féin representatives early in the process and convincing them that the blocks to their goals lay as much among Northern Ireland Unionists as with the British Government. They played a similar role in trying to communicate to Loyalists the realities of government policy in the Republic, and their judgement on the reliability of the IRA cessation. The Church intermediaries also played a key role in mediating between republicans, reducing possibilities of feuding and encouraging dialogue which eventually saw the INLA declare a ceasefire.

The 1998 Agreement: impact and compromises

As we have seen the 1998 Agreement was full of ambiguity. Because of this some have asked: was there an Agreement at all, or was it simply a series of undertakings made between individual parties and the British Government? In other words, did the parties negotiate with the British Government and effectively ignore each other? To argue this is to undersell the Agreement. Some parties negotiated directly with each other, e.g. the UUP and the SDLP, the PUP, Women’s Coalition and Sinn Féin. Even if some parties, such as the UUP and Sinn Féin, did not negotiate directly with each other until well into the process, they all agreed to work the institutions, given certain conditions. People disagree as to which parties fulfilled their commitments, but all the parties took part in the Assembly and Executive for protracted periods. The fact that there were difficulties should not detract from the achievement of the Agreement.

As with all political agreements in conflict situations compromise was difficult.

For Republicans it meant putting their dream of unity on the back burner by accepting the principle of consent and committing themselves to giving up violence which had been central to their tactics for decades.

For the SDLP many believe the Agreement was a major reason for their electoral decline, but this was also due to a failure to bring in younger candidates at an earlier stage.

For Unionists it meant facing issues such as the early release of prisoners and the reform of the RUC. Many found these repugnant, some on the basis of their religious beliefs. Others also believed the Agreement weakened the Union, despite the clarity of the clauses on the need for consent. Certainly involvement with Sinn Féin in the absence of unionist satisfaction with decommissioning led to the electoral weakening of the UUP.

The Irish Government gave up its alleged claims to Northern Ireland under Articles II and III of the Republic’s Constitution - a key unionist demand for many years. Any change in a written Constitution can be problematic and this proved to be the case when in 2004 the Irish Government held a successful referendum to limit the impact of the new Article II which granted Irish citizenship to children born in Ireland to non-national parents. Southern parties like Fianna Fail also paid a price electorally with the growth of Sinn Féin in the Republic.

The British Government accepted that a decision over a section of its national territory would be made in part by the people of a different state: under the principle of consent they agreed to cooperate with the Irish Government in setting up a United Ireland if the people of Northern Ireland together with the people of the Republic voted for this in referenda.

The Agreement was therefore not easy for any of the participants. Yet the fact that it was made changed politics in Northern Ireland dramatically.

It cemented the relationship between the two Governments.

It opened the possibility among Unionists of power-sharing not only with the SDLP, but also with Republicans. In 2003 the majority of Unionists voted for the DUP, thus rejecting the Agreement. But surveys showed that in the event of Republicans removing arms from the equation the majority of Unionists would be willing to enter government with them.

The Agreement was important in persuading Republicans to stay on cessation and this in turn helped them make political progress among Nationalists and in the Republic.

Cross-border institutions were set up and in time were no longer a contentious issue.

On the other hand the Agreement may also have helped make sectarianism worse. As part of the equality agenda the Police, following Parades Commission decisions, re-routed many Orange parades away from nationalist areas. This brought many interface communities into open and on-going conflict which deeply damaged trust and relationships. Many Protestants felt they were treated unfairly in comparison with Republicans. They felt their sense of Britishness was eroded. This feeling interacted with the general sense of unionist insecurity. In turn this was related to the decline of power and status among Protestants in Ireland as a whole since Catholic Emancipation in 1829. The world as Unionists knew it changed and they saw themselves worse off as a result. Their sense of security about the future was undermined and they feared they were heading to a United Ireland. There were deep divisions between pro- and anti-Agreement people. As the process developed a majority moved to the anti-Agreement position. Even in 1998 only a bare majority of Unionists had supported it.

By the end of the summer of 2004, the Executive had been suspended for almost two years. It remained to be seen if the IRA would or could meet DUP demands for disbandment, and if not, if the unionist community would still support the DUP in the absence of devolution.

Other Factors in the Process

Time to adjust to painful change

One often overlooked factor which helped the peace process was the length of time it survived. The mere fact of its continued existence bought much needed time. Each passing year that it survived gave people space and time to get used to new and often painful realities. That is why it was so important that it was kept going, even if sometimes it seemed to be on a life-support machine. There were other periods when it was vibrant. But the longer it existed the better people were able to get used to the most uncomfortable changes and also to come to terms with the fact that these changes were not going to be reversed. This did not reduce disagreement but it reduced the emotional content of some disagreement.

For example, cross-border institutions were a major bone of contention for Unionists for many years. Yet when the North-South Ministerial Body was opened in Armagh on 2nd December 1999 there was one solitary protester. The length of the negotiations had given Unionists time to get used to the fact that if there was to be an Agreement it would include North-South bodies. During the negotiations it was eventually accepted that these would be accountable to the Dublin and Stormont Governments (although the London Government took over when the Executive was suspended), but the details probably mattered less than the fact that the emotion surrounding the bodies was gradually reduced. This was in marked contrast to the situation in 1974-5 when the Sunningdale Agreement collapsed, arguably over this issue.

Similarly for many Republicans being part of a Northern Ireland Assembly and accepting ministries in a government devolved from Westminster were at first anathema. Yet over time they too got used to these and quickly gave the impression that they had been in Stormont (in nationalist eyes, that great bastion of unionist power) for years.

The fact that the Executive survived as long as it did was important. It gave Northern Ireland politicians a taste of power. The intervention of the British Government in suspending the Executive at different times was critical. Had they not done this the UUP would have resigned because of their dissatisfaction with the lack of IRA decommissioning. The appointment (or re-appointment) of a First Minister would have required an election within the Assembly. A majority of Unionists would have been necessary for this to succeed and this majority did not exist. By suspending the Executive the British Government were able to restore it without the requirement of an election for a First Minister, and so the process continued. The DUP complained that this was not democratic. The Dublin Government and Sinn Féin complained that it was not respecting the will of the people of Ireland who had voted for the Assembly and therefore for the Executive in the Agreement. But the rules of the Agreement - which the Dublin Government and Sinn Féin had accepted - allowed for this and if the British Government had not acted as it did the Executive would have collapsed and it would have been much more difficult to keep the process as a whole alive.

The passage of time allowed for the relationship between the UUP and Sinn Féin to thaw at a leadership level, however slowly. This meant, for example, that when the choreography which was part of the UUP-Sinn Féin deal in October 2003 broke down, recriminations between them were much more limited than many expected. Some even wondered if there had been a secret deal between them to allow Trimble go into the election without an agreement so as to help the UUP vote.

The passage of time also helped many Unionists to accept gradually that the IRA cessation, while imperfect, was serious, and that the IRA did not intend to go back to full-scale violence.

David Trimble was able to go into government in the absence of decommissioning on four occasions and survive. Gerry Adams was able to persuade the IRA to decommission on three occasions and survive. These events could not have happened without the passage of a considerable amount of time.

Time was also critical in that it meant judgements could be made especially by David Trimble and Gerry Adams as to when they could make a difficult move. So the longer the IRA remained on cessation the more unlikely it was that they would return to violence. In part this was because they made political gains which they would lose if they returned to violence.

The time factor also helped movement within the DUP. While remaining adamant that they would not go into government or work on committees with Sinn Féin, they did both. They also refused for many years to appear on public platforms with Sinn Féin but in time this also changed as they began to appear in TV studios with them, although never speaking to them directly. When they emerged as the largest party in 2003 they engaged in the subsequent talks on the basis that they wanted a new Agreement. But they knew the two Governments would not accept devolution without the involvement of Sinn Féin. If the DUP wanted devolution they would therefore have to come to some agreement with Republicans. Some characterised the behaviour of the DUP towards Sinn Féin as equivalent to that of the UUP seven years previously. For its part the DUP said it would only go into government with Sinn Féin when the IRA was abolished.

Ambiguous language

The language of the Agreement was ambivalent in many places, as also was that used by many particpants in the wider peace process. This helped keep the process alive because different groups could take the interpretation from it which best suited them. An example is the decommissioning clauses. Read literally, all Sinn Féin were required to do was to try to persuade the IRA to decommission by 2000 (two years after the Agreement). Read with the belief that Sinn Féin and the IRA are two sides of the same coin, and also in the light of other clauses in the Agreement requiring the removal of all threat of violence, the IRA were required to have completed decommissioning by 2000.

The fudged language was one of the factors which enabled the IRA not to have to face decommissioning for many years into the process. This was a major problem for Unionists, but arguably had the IRA been faced with this earlier the process would have collapsed. In the end the IRA had to start decommissioning, not because the Agreement required it, but because the UUP required it as a condition of staying in government with Sinn Féin.

At the same time the ambivalence of the Agreement bred distrust because it allowed Republicans to say they were on their way to a United Ireland (a claim which was necessary for their own followers), and this created great fear among Unionists. This fear existed despite the fact that the principle of consent clauses in the Agreement was one of the few places where the language of the document is not ambivalent. These state that no constitutional change can take place without the consent of the majority both of Northern Ireland and of the Republic. Unionists could have pointed to these clauses as greatly strengthening the Union.

Eventually, however, the ambivalent language became counter-productive. An example was the constant denials by Gerry Adams that he was ever in the IRA. Perhaps this is true, but it is hard to find anyone in Northern Ireland who believes it. At one period the denial may have been necessary to avoid arrest but this was hardly the case as the process advanced. A second example was the constant denials by the British Government of charges of collusion, even though considerable sums were paid in out-of-court settlements to those who brought such charges. A third was constant denials by paramilitaries, especially Loyalists, that they were or had been involved in drugs and smuggling rackets. All these undermined credibility in groups which were central to the peace process and this in turn undermined credibility in the process itself. This ambiguity debased political life in Northern Ireland. Because of it many found it difficult to believe much of what any politician said. It was clear that the ‘guns and government’ issue in the Autumn of 2004 could not be fudged in the same way as previously. But by that time, because the process had survived for so long and because Sinn Féin had made significant gains in the polls, it was easier for Republicans to address the issue.

Democratic structures and international encouragement

The fact that democratic structures had already been established in Northern Ireland and that abuses like the gerrymandering of the early 1970s were removed meant that Republicans could see the possibility of an alternative to violence. Their success at the polls and the correlation between this and moves towards ending violence was also important in helping the Adams’ wing persuade others in the movement to support the process. The importance of this should not be overlooked. One of the reasons it has been difficult to make progress in some other conflicts is because of the absence of a democratic option for ex-combatants, and in the Northern Ireland context one of the difficulties faced by Loyalists is their limited political prospects.

The encouragement of the EU, and in particular of the US Government under President Clinton, also helped Republicans imagine the potential of politics. Part of the US contribution was to reach out to Unionists. The encouragement of President Clinton also helped convince many Republicans that they would be able to make a political impact if they ended violence.

The process was helped by visits to South Africa, the US, and other countries. These allowed for some relationships to develop between individuals, but it also showed how other countries - albeit within very different contexts - had come through an extremely violent past.

Economic changes among UUP and DUP supporters

From the early 1960s manufacturing and textile industries suffered significant decline in Northern Ireland. This can be seen in the dramatic decline in numbers working in Harland and Wolff: down from 35,000 during World War II to approximately 90 permanent and 150 temporary staff by 2004. Much of the business support for the UUP came from groups involved in these industries. As these declined and as the UK became part of a more globalised economy it became less significant economically whether or not Northern Ireland remained part of the UK or joined a United Ireland. In fact, arguably, business people were less concerned about what political party had power, or what the structure of the State was, provided they could get on with making money. In this context they began to encourage Unionists to take part in talks, they supported power-sharing initially with the SDLP, and after the 1994 and 1997 cessations they engaged in dialogue with Sinn Féin. Given the traditional links between the UUP and the business community this was an important change.

The changing economic circumstances also gave a fillip to the DUP as those laid off in traditional Protestant industries resented the changing economic circumstances that saw them decline and Catholics prosper. So they shifted allegiances towards the DUP. At the same time elements of the DUP saw the necessity to modernise and engage with both business people and the Catholic middle class if they were to achieve power.

Lack of symmetry between the parties

An important aspect of the conflict was the lack of symmetry between the parties. Outsiders often focussed on the unionist-nationalist conflict. Yet Republicans saw their conflict as being with the British Government and in the early stages tended to see Unionists as simply pawns of the British. It took time for them to realise that the blocks to their ambitions lay in Belfast as much as in London. Unionists saw Republicans as a threat but their answer to the threat was to focus on British responses to Republicans. The two parties did not have face-to-face negotiations until after the Agreement.

At times, because of the threat of renewed republican violence the British Government focussed on Sinn Féin demands and paid less attention to those of Unionists. At other times, when they feared that the UUP would pull down the process, they did the opposite. Each party therefore pulled at the strings of the British Government and were often focussed on it rather than on each other. At the same time, Unionists were more likely to be obsessed with Republicans than vice versa.

As the process developed and after Northern Ireland politicians had experienced devolution, it became clear to both Unionists and Republicans that they could not continue with devolution without the consent of each other. When the DUP and Sinn Féin defeated the UUP and the SDLP respectively in the 2003 election it was obvious that any devolved government would have to be agreed between the two leading parties.

The two Governments did not act as disinterested outsiders (although they liked to present this as their stance). In practice their role varied from aggressively championing one of the internal groups to working together in challenging one or both. Gradually throughout the process they moved more towards the latter position.

Who were the parties to the conflict?

During the peace process there was a gradual movement from seeing the conflict as a clash of identities to seeing it as a double minority problem. This in turn led to an emphasis on the need for status, respect and economic improvement. In the early stages Nationalists successfully presented themselves as the more marginalised. In later years Unionists, especially Loyalists, argued that it was they and not Nationalists who were the more excluded.

The double minority thesis maintains not only that both Unionists and Nationalists saw themselves as a minority, but also that each had an ambivalent relationship with the London or Dublin Government, and that these had an up and down relationship with each other. One advantage of this approach is that it avoids the temptation to see the conflict as simply one between Unionists and Nationalists. The British and Irish Governments were also involved, as was the US. The importance of asking who the protagonists are can be seen in the Middle East: one would make a profound mistake by assuming the conflict there is only between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. The US, and to a lesser extent, surrounding Arab States and the EU, are all heavily involved, and they see their own interests at stake in the conflict.

Lack of dialogue among segregated groups

A major problem in the process was that segregation not only persisted but deepened after the 1998 Agreement. The process for the most part was conducted between the two Governments and the political parties. When the British Government intervened at a local level, for example at Drumcree in Portadown or with other interface issues, it faced a dilemma. Local issues, such as disputed parades, were symptoms of, and related to, the wider conflict. Secondly, they were often win-lose situations: either a parade went ahead or it did not. It was highly unlikely that locals would agree an outcome given that the rest of Northern Ireland was bitterly divided and given also that issues such as parades were highly emotive. There were exceptions to this rule, such as in Londonderry, where local residents and Apprentice Boys eventually worked out a way to handle the parades issue.

Divisions between Unionists and Nationalists were made worse because on the one hand Republicans believed it was in their interests to highlight what they saw as progress towards a United Ireland and to hold out for further gains on issues such as policing, while the DUP highlighted the threat of Republicans. Both the DUP and Sinn Féin gained electorally from these tactics. They were then left with a problem: if they wanted devolved government they had to win the consent of the other side. They also had to get the consent of their own followers. Given that many had voted for the DUP on the grounds that they would prefer Direct Rule in all circumstances to seeing Sinn Féin in government, the DUP was left with the question of how it could sell any deal which included Sinn Féin to its electorate.

This highlighted the vast need for dialogue among non-party-political groups. Without this it was difficult to see how the political parties could get the space to make compromises, even if they wanted to do so. During the process some in the political parties had gained considerable new experience of dealing with former enemies. This was especially true of those who were negotiators. While others in the parties were not directly involved nonetheless they still learnt something about the other side from what their negotiators said. However, the wider public had no direct experience of the process. Most had never discussed politics or their differences with people from the other community. In this context the need for dialogue, and the lack of attention paid to it, was glaring.

The ineffectiveness of violence

Many in Northern Ireland, both Unionists and Nationalists, believe that Republicans achieved what they did because of violence. Many Loyalists - and probably some Unionists - also believe that a major influence in bringing the IRA to a cessation was loyalist murders of ordinary Catholics. Others believe that security-force violence successfully blocked the IRA. These beliefs are almost certainly wrong. Further, the existence of these beliefs makes it more likely that groups will resort to violence in the future.

As Unionists saw it, before the cessation Republicans were officially seen by the Government as criminals. If they were arrested and convicted they were sent to jail. During the peace process that all changed. Republicans were let out of jail, they were seen by the Government as legitimate politicians, one Sinn Féin member became the Minister for Education and another the Minister for Health and there was even talk of Gerry Adams getting the Nobel Peace prize. If Republicans did not get all this through violence how else did they get it?

For Republicans, a commitment to violence as a means of expelling the British from Northern Ireland was always important. So it was difficult for them to entertain the idea that violence was not central to their achievements.

In reality, however, the violence of Republicans was the biggest block to their political progress (Unionists collapsed the Executive on four occasions because of the ‘guns and government’ issue). Before the ceasefire they had great difficulty in persuading anyone outside their ranks to talk to them. There were contacts with the British Government, some Roman Catholic priests kept in touch with them and the Hume-Adams talks took place. But the purpose of these was to persuade Republicans to end violence. The US government refused Republicans visas (with the notable exception of Clinton in 1994, and that was because he hoped it would help Adams get a ceasefire). Because of the violence the Catholic community (the majority of whom always opposed violence) were bitterly divided. As well as this, violence had a particularly negative impact on community work in more deprived areas, and the skills and efforts of many talented individuals, instead of going into community and economic enterprises, were focussed on killing people. More Catholics were killed by republican paramilitaries than by the security forces and Loyalists combined. The violence alienated many Nationalists, especially in the South, from the idea of a United Ireland. It increased unionist fears of a United Ireland, of Catholics in general, and of Republicans in particular. Together with State and loyalist violence republican violence helped the growth of sectarianism, it reduced tolerance and increased segregation. It left a legacy by giving future generations a role model they could follow, and it left open the argument that others who were dissatisfied with their political situation had as much right as Republicans to turn to violence to bring about change.

There was one other impact of republican violence: while violence was on-going it was a block to negotiations and therefore to any progress Republicans wished to make politically. The British Government frequently put the argument to the Dublin Government that there was no point in their making concessions because these would not end the violence. However, while violence before the cessation was a block to republican progress, after the cessation the threat of returning to violence was effective as a means to extract concessions. One can argue, therefore, that the threat would have been ineffective had it not been preceded with actual violence. Without this threat how many concessions would Sinn Féin have failed to gain? It is not possible to answer this question but a guess is that they would have failed to win some changes in policing. How much difference these changes would make to policing on the ground remains to be seen. It would be difficult to argue that they were worth the pain and division caused by the violence.

On other occasions Republicans were helped by Unionists. In response to demands for decommissioning they were able to ask `What will you give us in return?' It was always a matter of judgment as to whether republican threats were real, and, if so, whether making concessions would lead to progress or simply to further demands. The Unionists' perception was that the Government undermined democratic politics by giving into threats. The perception of Republicans however, was that what they got were not concessions at all but human rights from which Unionists as well as everyone else benefited.

Loyalists argued that their violence was reactive: when the IRA stopped being a threat to the State they would in turn stop. Yet loyalist violence between 1996 and 2004 was far greater than that of Republicans. Further, unionist politicians constantly focussed on republican violence and tended only to mention loyalist violence as an afterthought, or in order to appear balanced. While many Loyalists believe their violence was important in persuading Republicans to move to a ceasefire, Republicans deny this and point instead to the political potential they saw in a ceasefire as being more important.

The security forces always maintained that they only killed people in self-defence. There have been too many questionable incidents for this to be credibly maintained - examples are the killings investigated by John Stalker, and the Pat Finucane, Billy Wright and Rosemary Nelson murders. Presumably those who ordered security-force killings believed they were effective. In reality they gave the republican movement martyrs and reinforced the beliefs of those who found the State unjust. To that extent they were ineffective. In practice intelligence work by the security forces probably made a far greater impact on the IRA than any extra-judicial killings which the security forces carried out or supported. It can, however, be argued that by supporting loyalist killings the State helped promote the perception of the conflict as a nasty, sectarian conflict, which made it more difficult for Republicans to present it as a glorious struggle for national independence.

Others point out that looking for rational arguments for violence make no sense because violence in practice does not break out as a result of a commitment to some ideology. Often it is not part of a coherent plan. Rather it develops in different places as an immediate response to a perceived attack, without anyone seeing the long-term consequences and only gradually tu