Violence begets violence, children learn by example

By Brian Lennon

Many people in Northern Ireland, both Unionists and Nationalists, are absolutely convinced that Republicans achieved what they did because of violence. Many Loyalists also believe that their murders of ordinary Catholics was a major influence in bringing the IRA to a cessation. Others believe that security-force violence successfully blocked the IRA. These beliefs are almost certainly wrong. Further, the existence of these beliefs makes it more likely that groups will resort to violence in the future.

The violence of Republicans was actually the biggest block to their political progress: Unionists collapsed the Executive on four occasions because of the ‘guns and government’ issue. Before their 1994 ceassation Republicans had great difficulty in persuading anyone outside their ranks to talk to them. The violence bitterly divided the Catholic community – the majority always opposed it. Violence had a particularly negative impact on community work in more deprived areas, and the skills and efforts of many talented individuals, instead of going into community and economic enterprises, were focussed on killing people. More Catholics were killed by republican paramilitaries than by the security forces and Loyalists combined.

The violence alienated many Nationalists, especially in the South, from the idea of a United Ireland. It increased unionist fears of a United Ireland, of Catholics in general, and of Republicans in particular. Together with State and loyalist violence republican violence helped the growth of sectarianism, it reduced tolerance and increased segregation.

The British frequently put the argument to the Dublin Government that there was no point in their making concessions because these would not end the violence. However, while violence before the cessation was a block to republican progress, after the cessation the threat of returning to violence was effective as a means to extract concessions. One can argue, therefore, that the threat would have been ineffective had it not been preceded with actual violence.

Without this threat how many concessions would Sinn Féin have failed to gain? It is not possible to answer this question but a guess is that they would have failed to win some changes in policing. How much difference these changes would make to policing on the ground remains to be seen. It would be difficult to argue that they were worth the pain and division caused by the violence.

Loyalists argued that their violence was reactive: when the IRA stopped being a threat to the State they would in turn stop. Yet loyalist violence between 1997 and 2004 was far greater than that of Republicans. Further, unionist politicians constantly focussed on republican violence and tended only to mention loyalist violence as an afterthought, or in order to appear balanced. While many Loyalists believe their violence was important in persuading Republicans to move to a ceasefire, Republicans deny this and point instead to the political potential they saw in a ceasefire as being more important.

The security forces always maintained that they only killed people in self-defence. There have been too many questionable incidents for this to be credibly maintained - examples are the killings investigated by John Stalker, and the Pat Finucane, Billy Wright and Rosemary Nelson murders. Presumably those who ordered security-force killings believed they were effective. In reality they gave the republican movement martyrs and reinforced the beliefs of those who found the State unjust. To that extent they were ineffective.

In practice intelligence work by the security forces probably made a far greater impact on the IRA than any killings by the security forces. It can be argued, however, that by supporting loyalist killings the State helped promote the perception of the conflict as a nasty, sectarian conflict, which made it more difficult for Republicans to present it as a glorious struggle for national independence.

Others point out that looking for rational arguments for violence make no sense because violence in practice often does not break out as a result of a coherent plan. Rather it develops in different places as an immediate response to a perceived attack, without anyone seeing the long-term consequences. Only gradually does it turn into a coherent movement. From this standpoint it is useless to argue about the achievements or otherwise of violence. Instead one should focus on the conditions which made violence more or less likely.

One element which increased the likelihood of republican violence was their interpretation of Irish history. They focussed on the physical-force tradition to show that there had been a centuries-long violent struggle for Irish freedom. Others would differ and point out that 19th century Irish history was dominated by the figures of Daniel O'Connell and Charles Stewart Parnell - both of whom were constitutionalists (although Parnell was not averse to the threat of force on occasion) - and that the 1916 Rising was initially supported by very few. The real change in Irish history, in this view, came with the transfer of land from landlords to peasants. Michael Davitt was the most prominent figure in this struggle, and although a member of the Fenians, his success was due not to violence, but to his combined political work with Parnell.

Whatever view one takes of this issue, the fact is that one of the models available to northern Catholics in 1969 was the 1916 Rising and that was the model a minority adopted. This was in marked contrast to the route chosen by African-Americans in the US, the majority of whom followed the path of Martin Luther King in dealing with the race issue.

For their part, Loyalists in using force were following the example of the British who took the island of Ireland by force (helped by many Irish people), and both force and the threat of force were central in ensuring that Northern Ireland was separated politically from the rest of the island in 1920. They were therefore ill placed to condemn republican violence.

One result of the violence, and the widespread belief that it led to political progress, was that it made it more difficult to persuade young people that violence was not the only, or natural, or best way to resolve problems. This is made worse by the glorification both by the State and by paramilitaries of what they had done in the past.

Note

This article is based on part of Peace Comes Dropping Slow: Dialogue and Conflict Management in the Northern Ireland conflict, by Brian Lennon, published by Community Dialogue (Belfast: 9032-9995; www.communitydialogue.org).