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A voice for community and voluntary
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What if the Review Fails: Plan B?
This document contains the papers given at a Community
Dialogue conference in the
Grosvenor Hall, Belfast on 24 August 1999 on the theme
`What if the Review fails: Plan B?’
The purpose was to examine what would happen if the
politicians failed to come to an agreement
which would lead to a restoration of the Executive.
Chair: Bronagh Hinds
Contents
David Holloway: Welcome
Maggie Beirne: Plan B: What is it likely to be?
Sir Kenneth Bloomfield: What if the Review Fails?
John Simpson: Default “Plan B”
WELCOME
David Holloway
Chairman, Community Dialogue
As Chairman of Community Dialogue I want to welcome
each of you here today.
In the Summer of 1997 the IRA ceasefire opened the
way for a series of multi-party talks which led to the
signing of the Belfast Agreement. During the process
of these talks the people of Northern Ireland existed
in a state of tension as their future was negotiated
behind closed doors. Across our society individuals
and groups felt locked out of the process and felt that
their views were not being heard.
It was within this context that Community Dialogue
was formed in October 1997 as a cross-community group
committed to fostering informed political dialogue throughout
our society.
Since then we have produced twelve leaflets, circulated
in their thousands, designed to help people explore
through discussion what they want for their future.
Our latest leaflet - The Way We Are - has just been
published and you should find a copy on your seat. Many
of you will have seen a slightly shorter version which
was published jointly yesterday in the Belfast News
Letter and the Irish News. Our leaflets and subsequent
discussions ranged across all the Agreement issues from
decommissioning, through policing, to the release of
prisoners.
In each of our leaflets we asked three key questions:
Ø What do you want from a political settlement?
Ø What can you live with, bearing in mind that
others want different things from you?
Ø If you cannot accept what is on offer, what
is your alternative?
Since the Referendum we have continued to produce leaflets
and facilitate discussion and today's meeting is part
of that ongoing process.
Once again we are asking: "What is it that you
really want?" But in order to answer that question
we need to ask a prior question: "What are the
choices facing us?"
One choice is to go ahead with the Agreement because
our politicians agreed to it and 71% of our people voted
for it.
A second choice is to reject the Agreement or agree
that we are unable to implement it. What are the consequences
of such a decision?
The question then becomes: "Given that the failure
of the September Review is likely to lead to the following
consequences, do we want the Review to succeed or fail?"
Or, to put it another way: "In the light of the
likely consequences, how much are we willing to pay
to see the Review succeed or fail?"
This then is the question which faces us today. I am
delighted to see you all here today and I look forward
to a lively but respectful dialogue.
Plan B: What is it likely to be?
Maggie Beirne
To cite the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
speaking at a conference in Belfast in December 1998:
"(The Good Friday Agreement is) conspicuous by
the centrality it gives to equality a human rights concerns.
Few documents emerging from divisive and difficult political
negotiations have so well captured the importance of
fairness in creating right relationships. In its preambular
paragraphs, throughout the text, and indeed in all new
institutions and mechanisms established as a result
of the Agreement, concerns around fairness and justice
are a recurring theme”.
Very importantly, Mrs Mary Robinson went to say that:
"Equality and rights are something for us all,
and something which enriches us all. It is not simply
the people with disabilities who benefit when public
policy has to consider issues of access; it is not simply
Travellers or other ethnic minorities who benefit from
strong anti-racist protections and measures. A society
which seeks to recognise the richness of difference,
and to respect its many manifestations in the people
that constitute that society is a truly healthy one”.
I believe that any "Plan B" will include
human rights and equality provisions at least to the
same extent, and perhaps more so, than is on the table
currently with the Agreement, and that there will no
successful attempt to roll back from the advances made.
I make this claim knowing full well that I have been
asked to suggest what Plan B is likely to be, not merely
what I would like it to be. The reasons for this contention
are as follows:
Ø Firstly, the talks process, and the implementation
of the human rights and equality provisions since the
passage of the Agreement, have confirmed that human
rights is not part of the "Zero sum game"
of Northern Irish politics. Everyone can and does benefit
from strong human rights protections. Accordingly, it
is in no one's interests to undermine, or to draw back,
from the advances that were made to date.
Ø Secondly, it would be politically impossible
for several of the parties to the Agreement, but particularly
the British or Irish Governments, to suggest to the
world community that the human rights and equality advances
secured in the Agreement had been merely pawns in a
political process which could now be foregone. For example,
what possible grounds would the UK or the Republic of
Ireland have for suggesting that Human Rights Commissions
were no longer necessary in their respective jurisdictions,
and what opprobrium would descend on them from the UN,
the US. Europe, and elsewhere, if they tried to do so?
Who could convincingly argue that there are no policing
issues needed to be addressed in Northern Ireland?
Ø Thirdly, many of the most important measures
proposed are now well in train. The Human Rights and
Equality Commissions exist in statute, and have been
established. The Commission into Policing has been working
hard for over a year, and will probably report before
any "Plan B" comes up for discussion. The
criminal justice review is well advanced and expects
to be reporting in the next few months. Other promised
measures - a Bill of Rights, economic measures, the
participation of women in public life etc - are all
of a longer term nature and theoretically could therefore
be suspended or delayed, but this seems extremely unlikely
for the reasons given earlier.
This is not to say that some issues with a human rights
dimension will not be re-visited at all. For example,
it is one thing for the Patten Commission to complete
its work, it is quite another for there to be political
agreement around its recommendations and the process
and timetable for implementation.
So "Plan B" will have at least the same human
rights provisions we have now. But will it go further?
One way in which "Plan B" might well build
upon the human rights dimension of the Agreement would
be to recognise that international standards have proved
useful in creating an objective framework within which
Nationalists and Unionists can argue their respective
positions, and hopefully develop some consensus.
Thus, looking ahead, arguments about marching (which
often divide along communal lines) could be made more
amenable to resolution if they were placed within the
broader context of international human rights principles
and standards. Developing a truly inclusive sense of
ownership of the rights debate would be a major step
forward in developing right relationships with each
other. To this end, more measures aimed at longer term
human rights education and awareness programmes could
be very helpful.
If a "Plan B" is needed, and that of course
is a big "if” that has not been addressed
here, since it is to a larger extent dependent on the
will of the different parties engaged in direct negotiations,
it will surely build upon some of the learning that
took place around the Agreement. At least one of the
lessons of the Agreement was that moves towards a more
fair and just society are in everyone's interests.
Note: MAGGIE BEIRNE has been the Research & Policy
Officer for the Committee on the Administration of Justice
(CAJ) for four years. The Committee on the Administration
of Justice is a non-governmental organisation which
works for a just and peaceful society in Northern Ireland
where the human rights of all are protected. It won
the 1998 Council of Europe Human Rights Prize. Maggie
studied for a period of study as a mature student at
Oxford University and Queens, and worked for some 17
years on international human rights with Amnesty International.
She had senior management responsibility for the organisation’s
international campaigning and membership programme.
Plan B: What if the Review Fails
Sir Kenneth Bloomfield
There are several things I want to say at the outset.
The first is that I am not now, never have been, and
do not intend to become a member of any political party.
It follows from this that any views I express today
are strictly my own.
The second is that we need to keep very clearly in
mind throughout this morning a distinction between what
one would like to happen, what one feels ought to happen
and what is likely to happen.
The third is that the use of the word “plan”
can too easily be accepted as shorthand for the idea
that some or all of the parties have in their back pocket
a ready-made alternative to the Belfast Agreement. I
hope and believe that those who have said so firmly
“There is no Plan B” did not imply in doing
so that the alternative to the Agreement is necessarily
Armageddon, but were rather reflecting the reality that
outcomes commanding consensus cannot be pre-determined.
And my fourth point is this:- what is the most important
outcome we should be seeking from any proposal, plan
or conclusion? Much though I yearn for better, more
democratic, more inclusive and more accountable arrangements
for the governance of Northern Ireland, for me the primary
objective must be to protect the partial and flawed
peace we currently enjoy and to build upon it a more
complete and more assured peace. I am influenced by
some painful experience, first as Northern Ireland Victims’
Commissioner and more recently as Co-Commissioner for
the Recovery of Victims’ Remains. In the course
of this work I have met face to face too many of the
bereaved, the mutilated and the traumatised to believe
that there can be any higher priority than that of drawing
to a close an appalling period in the history of our
community.
I am one of those who voted for the Belfast Agreement,
not because I deemed it to be ideal or perfect in every
particular, but because it seemed to offer the best
hope of rebuilding a fractured community. But I knew
even as I cast my vote that the Agreement of itself
was not capable of solving every problem. That is by
no means unusual in such cases. I was to listen later,
here in Belfast, to an account by an eminent Norwegian
of the so called “Norway Channel” negotiations
between the Israelis and the Palestinians. It was quite
clear from this account that there was no prospect at
all of the parties reaching at that time any agreement
about the future of Jerusalem. And so, like an advancing
army which swirls around some enemy’s strong-point
and leaves it behind in the interests of the wider campaign,
the “J’ issue was simply bypassed as the delegates
moved forward on other points. In very similar fashion
I have a sense that our own parties picked their way
carefully around the “D” issue.
Now as we approach next month’s review, it is
tempting to say that failure is so unthinkable that
it would be better not even to talk about it. And it
is certainly infinitely frustrating and hideously disappointing
that the entire movement forward could now be held up
on a single issue, sensitive and important though it
is. Yet in truth real progress can only be made on that
issue if the leaders of the respective camps can find
a solution which their own supporters are willing to
accept if not support. And I think that it is not only
legitimate but prudent to consider what is likely to
happen if that cannot be done. I would have very little
doubt that in that event almost all the elements of
the Belfast Agreement not requiring for their effective
delivery the participation of the local political parties
would move ahead. The British Government, remaining
in the absence of devolution responsible for the domestic
affairs of Northern Ireland, would I am sure, want to
push forward with co-operation with the Irish Government
on a very wide range of those issues identified in the
Agreement as suitable for North/South co-operation.
The questions of rights, safeguards and equality of
opportunity would, I am equally sure, be very vigorously
pursued. So many of the benefits which Nationalism has
looked to secure from the Agreement would still be deliverable
and in all probability delivered. Unionism, on the other
hand, could risk losing the elements of the Agreement
most attractive to them:- the revival of high-level
democratic institutions within Northern Ireland itself
the opportunity to be involved alongside other jurisdictions
in the New British/Irish Council; and the delivery of
long-sought after changes to Articles 2 and 3 of the
Irish Constitution. All of this would not be “Plan
B” but “probable situation B”.
Many would argue that, since this entirely foreseeable
outcome would be demonstrably more unfavourable to some
unionist interests than the full implementation of the
original Agreement, its leadership should be able to
find a way to circumvent the problem represented by
the decommissioning issue. It will be said that unless
and until the proposed democratic and inclusive institutions
are activated, the willingness to decommission within
whatever timescale may be contemplated will never be
tested. It will be pointed out, and it is true that
the Agreement itself is cautious and even reticent about
decommissioning, and that the only thing approaching
a deadline is a date well into the next year. Nevertheless,
my personal assessment remains that, in the absence
of some concrete evidence of a decommissioning process
actually underway, it would be impossible to deliver
sufficient unionist support to underpin a viable or
credible local executive.
Our present position at times reminds me very much
of some outstanding consortium of consulting engineers
who have designed the most modern of bridges - brilliant
in concept - spectacular in its use of materials and
components - to bridge a great river or ravine. The
partners in the consortium would have argued and debated
about elements of the design. On paper it is a remarkable
construct. But there is just one problem when the time
for construction comes - it won’t quite span the
divide for which it has been designed. By analogy, I
believe the forthcoming review could succeed, but is
unlikely to do so if any of the participants starts
from the point that is perfect in every particular.
It has not crossed the divide; it has not closed the
breach.
But I remind myself again that we are not here today
to discuss whether the Review should succeed or will
succeed, but rather the hypothetical questions of where
we may find ourselves if it should not succeed. That
would certainly be both a great disappointment and a
serious reverse. It would be bound, in the short-term,
to damage our hopes for increased tourism and investment.
It would leave us with the distinctly second-rate form
of democracy enjoyed or endured by this community since
the introduction of direct rule. In saying that I do
not imply any criticism of the efforts made within this
system by the present and previous Secretaries of State.
But it is unacceptable to have for almost 30 years important
primary legislation enacted into law by very flawed
procedures, and within a devolved United Kingdom to
have neither a regional assembly nor a significant tier
of local government. The temptation if the Review fails
would probably be to continue to keep all options open,
to retain the hope that at some other time in some other
circumstances movement towards devolution on an agreed
basis would be possible. But when are the circumstances
likely ever to be so favourable again? We cannot expect
indefinitely to have Prime Ministers tripping in and
out of here with almost monotonous regularity when there
are actually other commitments and other problems in
this world.
But if the Review should fail, it is imperative that
all the constructive players - including so many in
the voluntary and community sector - say loudly and
clearly: “we haven’t gone away, you know”.
We need to be active in ensuring that the new economic
vision for 2010 is pushed forward vigorously. We need
to continue the debate. We need to think how to buttress
confidence, not just our own confidence but the confidence
of others. We have lived in a society of demands rather
than a society of concessions. We face a crisis; but
it need not be, must not be, a calamity.
Note:
Sir Kenneth Bloomfield was Head of the Northern Ireland
Civil Service from 1986 to 1991. He was National Governor
of the BBC for Northern Ireland from 1991-1999, Northern
Ireland Victims’ Commissioner from 1997-98 and
Commissioner for the Recover of Victims’ Remains
in 1999. He is author of Stormont in Crisis (a Memoir)
and We Will Remember Them (Report of the Victims’
Commission). He is President of Ulster People’s
College and Chairman of the Northern Ireland Higher
Education Council. He holds an Honorary LL.D from Queen’s
University Belfast and is an Honorary Fellow of St Peter’s
College, Cambridge.
Default “Plan B”
John Simpson
If the Belfast Agreement fails to be implemented, Government
must be maintained to the best of the abilities of those
who hold continuing responsibility. This scenario is
not a recommended option; merely an attempt to consider
the impact of the political and other pressures created
by the stalled efforts to implement the Belfast Agreement.
The proposition, implicit in the Belfast Agreement,
is that a local administration, with local knowledge
and an understanding of local preferences, would be
likely to offer what is seen as a more relevant form
of Government than Direct Rule. If this does not happen,
the failure is not about the potential value of developed
institutions, it is about a lack of agreement on the
operational bases for it to function.
By default political processes will continue to function.
Plan B either can be a considered and agreed alternative
to, or adaptation of, the Belfast Agreement or it can
be an outcome where no formal Agreement is in place
and Government processes rely on the present institutional
arrangements and variations which lie within the competence
of the Direct Rule administration. This conference is
orientated to the latter context.
A 'Plan B by default' is not a preferred option; it
is an attempt to envisage evolving events in a situation
where the Belfast Agreement is 'parked' .
Default Plan B
The simplest suggestion is that 'Default Plan B' would
be a continuation of the present Direct Rule arrangements.
If a local legislative and executive devolved institution
is not established with sufficient support, the Direct
Rule model, as has evolved from 1972 to 1999, could
continue.
There are factors which make such an assumption too
easy and likely to be misleading. Other changes are
taking place which will alter the context of Direct
Rule in several ways.
Likely changes in the context of Direct Rule
1. The immeasurable and negative impact of the perceptions,
internal and external, of continuing political instability
and the effects this may have on business confidence,
external investment, migration and the property market
(residential and commercial):
The success of the economy in the last two years has
been helped in a major way by the perception and belief
that politically motivated violence has been greatly
reduced. Northern Ireland has gained and earned support
in many different ways from people, agencies, investors
and governments as a contribution to the peace process.
The dynamic of this support will be reduced, if not
reversed, if instability recurs. This is more than the
immeasurable effect on the number of tourists or the
movements in property prices. It is the immeasurable
and indirect decisions of people and companies about
living or locating in this region.
2. The community reactions to a failure to agree: whether
in community relations generally or in such areas as
the tensions of parades, failure to agree will erode
the efforts to build trust and better understanding
across the community divides:
Building bridges between the communities, or achieving
consensus on social policies, might be easier if there
was a political forum where positive leadership was
in evidence. When it is absent, the difficulties may
be greater.
3. The impact within the United Kingdom of the early
stages of decision making by the Scottish and Welsh
Assemblies:
Whether or not there is a devolved Government in Northern
Ireland, the Scots and the Welsh are now searching for
ways to make devolution attractive in those countries.
Suffice to add that Direct Rule is more likely to be
either centralist or parity based. Local initiatives
are less likely. Ideas such as those which may emerge
when strategy 2010 is reworked as a coherent strategy
are likely to face a more complex implementation procedure
when they go through NIO ministers.
4. The effect of lack of agreement, through the European
Commission, on decisions on Structural Funds and the
Peace programme:
The European Commission is committed to the extension
of the Peace Programme until 2003 and Objective 1 transition
status until 2005. However, there are many discretionary
decisions to taken (for example on Trans-European Energy
Networks) which will benefit from goodwill 1 a sense
of reinforcing the peace process.
5. The impact of decisions on public expenditure total
made by the Treasury as they affect current and capital
budgets and the review of the Barnett formula:
The way in which the Treasury allocates funds to Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland is under review. Northern
Ireland is vulnerable to a number of forces for change
which may be disadvantageous. First, the pressure to
reduce the disparities which favour Northern Ireland
is ever present. Second, the generous treatment of extra
expenditure caused by instability is also under pressure.
6. The links between the NIO and local political processes:
Default Plan B leaves the Secretary of State as the
principal decision maker in Government. The political
processes will continue to emphasise her/his role and
the local political parties will not have the direct
leverage which might come with an Assembly.
7. The evolution of North-South co-operation between
the British and Irish Governments:
The two national Governments must be expected to wish
to make progress in the subjects which have been earmarked
for cross-border co-operation. In the absence of an
Assembly, decisions these topics will be likely to be
controversial since the local political parties will
have differing ambitions.
8. The decisions to be made following the publication
of the Patten report on policing:
Policy questions in a number of areas are about to
go on the political agenda. Will the recommendations
of the Patten Commission be more or less likely to be
converted to policy changes in the absence of a local
forum?
9. The need to make progress in the areas within the
remit of the Equality Commission:
Just as with the policing recommendations, there are
similar questions on equality issues such as employment,
targeting social need, and development planning proposals
as in "Shaping our Future".
10. The risks of a return to violence:
If there is a return to politically motivated violence
then Default Plan B itself will be redundant. A much
more pessimistic scenario seems likely!
Conclusion
Each of these elements is difficult to predict with
precision in a Default Plan B scenario. The balance
of argument suggests that some aspects of Default Plan
B will be unpopular with some of the population. Default
Plan B is likely to take the line of least resistance.
Where active intervention is needed, the default plan
looks less appropriate.
Note: John Simpson is an economist and business consultant
who writes extensively on issues related to the Northern
Ireland economy. F formerly a Senior Lecturer in Economics
at Queen s University he is currently a member of the
Board of Northern Ireland Growth Challenge, Chairman
of the Emerging Business Trust and Vice-Chairman of
the Further Education Consultative Committee. He has
also served for a period as Chairman of both the Eastern
Health and Social Services Board, and the Probation
Board, and is currently a member of the National Lottery
Charities Board. He was active both as Chairman of Bryson
House and of the Northern Ireland Association of Citizens
Advice Bureaux and has served on the committees of Young
Enterprise and Industry Matters.
What is Community Dialogue?
Community Dialogue is made up of community workers
from across the divide. As a group we do not take positions
on political issues. However, if we want to make peace
in Northern Ireland we have to talk. Not just any old
talk: rather talk that involves questioning ourselves,
listening to others, and trying genuinely to see new
angles on things.
We invite you to make your voice heard. Why not discuss
the questions in this leaflet with your friends or work
colleagues? You could also invite people from backgrounds
different from your own to join you in discussion. If
you wish, you can send your answers, ideas and other
suggestions to us at Community Dialogue and we will
send them on to the relevant authorities, or politicians.
Remember: it is up to us to make the future!
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